![]() ![]() In other words, assuming that knowledge is justified true belief, then: suppose that P is some piece of knowledge. If the criterion of truth is justified by a premise, then that premise has to be justified by another premise, and so on, ad infinitum. If it is unjustified, then it is not to be trusted. This criterion is either justified, or it is not. ![]() Those who claim to possess the criterion of truth have a problem. Those who try to answer the first set of questions are usually particularists, which build from particular cases towards universal cases. Some philosophers try first to answer the second set of questions, these are usually the empiricist who answer that we know by the criteria of senses. This has the result of our being unable to justify any of our beliefs. The problem here is that since we cannot have an answer to the first set of questions without first answering the second set, and we cannot hope to answer the second set of questions without first knowing the answers to the first set, we are, therefore, unable to answer either. How do we know? or What is the criterion of knowing? What do we know? or What is the extent of our knowledge?Ģ. The problem stems further then this to the problem of criterion.ġ. The scientific method works by logical fallacy as all scientific theories, including Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, arise from induction.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |